INTRODUCTION WHAT IS COMMENSURATION?
Commensuration is the expression or measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units according to a common metric. Utility, price, and cost-benefit ratios are common examples of commensuration, although the logic of commensuration is implicit in a very wide range of valuing systems: college rankings that numerically compare organizations; censuses and social statistics that make cities and nations numerically comparable; actuarial projects that attempt to quantify and compare vastly different kinds of risks; commodity futures that make uniform units out of products that may not yet exist; voting, and the pork-barrel trading of diverse interests that often lies behind it; calculation of different kinds of work in terms of labor costs; and the ad hoc calculations of trade-offs among such potentially incomparable values as career and family, breadth and depth in scholarship, and freedom and commitment in love.
Commensuration transforms qualities into quantities, difference into magnitude. It is a way to reduce and simplify disparate information into numbers that can easily be compared. This transformation allows people to quickly grasp, represent, and compare differences. One virtue of commensuration is that it offers standardized ways of constructing proxies for uncertain and elusive qualities. Another virtue is that it condenses and reduces the amount of information people have to process, which is useful for representing value and simplifying decision-making. The complexity of decisions has propelled the spread of commensuration in decision-making (Stokey & Zeckhauser 1978) ; so too has our growing appreciation of people's cognitive limitations (Tversky & Kahneman 1974 Thaler 1983 ; for a good review see Heimer 1988 ). Commensuration makes possible more mechanized decision-making. Computer programs that calculate utility functions, elicit and measure values, and identify alternatives that maximize people's utility can assure the consistency that people lack; in some cases, they mechanically tell people what to do. The technical advantages of commensuration can be enormous, but sometimes its symbolic and political advantages are paramount (Feldman & March 1981) .
Commensuration sometimes responds to murky motives. It may be prompted by a desire to look rational, limit discretion, or conform to powerful expectations. Commensuration may be spurred by a desire to expand democratization (Cohen 1982 , Espeland 1998 ), or by a wish to hide behind numbers, impose order, or shore up weak authority (Porter 1995) . Commensuration can provide a robust defense for controversial decisions, expand a group's organizational or professional turf, or even be a means to appease God (Carruthers & Espeland 1991).
Our desire to manage uncertainty, impose control, or secure legitimacy propels us to create a dazzling array of strategies to use when we standardize. The scripts delivered by salespeople, the forms we use when we enroll our children in kindergarten or visit the doctor, and the practiced smiles of flight attendants are all forms of standardization. What distinguishes commensuration from other forms of standardization is the common metric it provides. When commensuration is used in decision-making, the procedure for deriving this metric amounts to a series of aggregations.
Most quantification can be understood as commensuration because quantification creates relations between different entities through a common metric. Commensuration is noticed most when it creates relations among things that seem fundamentally different; quantification seems distinct from commensuration when the objects linked by numbers already seem alike. When we assume the unity conferred by numbers, when the homogeneity among things appears to be a property of the object rather than something produced by quan-tification, then we imagine we are simply counting or measuring something rather than commensurating disparate entities. For example, the census appears to be a method for counting people rather than a mechanism for constructing and evaluating relations among citizens of a state or region. This is because implicit in the act of counting is a conception of citizenship or identity that renders unproblematic the coherence of the relations among diverse people. As Theodore Porter (1986:24) put it, "It makes no sense to count people if their common personhood is not seen as somehow more significant than their differences."l Commensuration is fundamentally relative. It creates relations between attributes or dimensions where value is revealed in the comparison. When used to make decisions, commensurated value is derived from the trade-offs made among the different aspects of a choice. Value emerges from comparisons that are framed in terms of how much of one thing is needed to compensate for something else. In complex choices, commensuration often occurs at several levels of analysis. For example, before building a dam, analysts want to know how the dam would affect the quality of water. Water quality has many dimensions (e.g. temperature, the amount and nature of dissolved solids, turbidity, pH), and even though these dimensions are already quantified, they are measured with different scales. Aggregating these attributes according to some broader metric creates "water quality."
The structure of value rooted in trade-offs is like that of an analogy: Its unity is based on the common relationship that two things have with a third thing, a metric. How difficult or controversial commensuration is depends partly on whether it is used routinely to express the value of something, on whether people accept it as a legitimate expression of value, and on how disparate-seeming are the entities being commensurated. For example, commodification has become so naturalized that it is hard to construe the value of some goods in forms apart from price.
Commensuration can be understood as a system for discarding information and organizing what remains into new forms. In abstracting and reducing information, the link between what is represented and the empirical world is obscured and uncertainty is absorbed (March & Simon 1958:138-39, 150-51). Everyday experience, practical reasoning, and empathetic identification become increasingly irrelevant bases for judgment as context is stripped away and relationships become more abstractly represented by numbers.
1Counting and measuring may be controversial if the likeness or comparability of the units being counted is disputed. For example, during the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Southerners who rejected slaves' citizenship rights nevertheless wished to expand their political clout in the House of Representatives. For the purposes of apportioning representatives, they agreed that slaves should count as "three-fifths of all other persons."
As we demonstrate below, the forms commensuration takes vary on several dimensions. First, modes of commensuration vary in how technologically elaborated they are. Some are highly elaborated, as in the cost-benefit analyses first developed by government bureaucrats and then elaborated by economists and decision theorists to adjudicate between diverse and often costly social policies (Porter 1992 (Porter , 1995 . Other modes are only marginally elaborated, such as the often ad hoc calculations made by spouses to determine the relative equitability of household chores (e.g. Hochschild 1989). Second, modes of commensuration vary in how visible or explicit they seem. There is some correlation between elaborateness of a mode of commensuration and explicitness of the project. For an economist trying to synthesize a demand curve for river tubing, the labor involved in commensuration is both deliberate and apparent; for spouses trying to equalize household contributions, the process may seem as natural as it does commonsensical. But performing some highly elaborated modes of commensuration, such as generating identical units of value in stocks or commodities futures (Cronon 1991:97-147; Porter 1995: 45-48), are complex technical feats that seem "natural" to traders and stockholders nevertheless. This suggests a third dimension of variation in modes of commensuration-institutionalization-which we address in further detail below. Finally, modes of commensuration vary according to who their agents are. Some modes are the jealously guarded turf of distinct professional bodies; actuary work in insurance is a prime example (Porter 1995:101-13). Other modes are made routine and then embedded in complex divisions of labor, as in the lower-level diagnostic and charting work done by nurses and physican residents, who standardize patients in part by transforming vital signs into discrete numerical measures (Bosk 1979 , Chambliss 1996 . Still other modes are common features of everyday social experience, as in consumers' efforts to locate bargains at the grocery store or make trade-offs among purchases.
HISTORICAL LEGACIES
The linking of rationality to commensurability, and irrationality to incommensurability, are old ideas that appealed to some of our deepest thinkers. As Martha Nussbaum wrote (1984:56-57; 1986), the pairing of numbering, measurement, and commensuration with order, the pairing of comprehension with control, and obversely, the pairing of incommensurability with chaos, anxiety, and threat are characteristic of Greek writing in the fifth and early fourth centuries BCE. Nussbaum argues that commensuration was crucial to Plato's understanding of the Good, since Plato believed that we need to make our ethical values commensurate in order to prioritize them. Complex ethical concerns, if left incommensurate, would create conflict, confusion, and pain.
As others would argue much later, Plato believed that commensuration as a mode of perceiving the world would also change those who used it. Commensuration would make us more rational and render human values more stable and less vulnerable to passion, luck, and fate. One of the great virtues of commensurability for Socrates and for Plato was that it could help us eliminate akrasia by structuring our choices in ways that make it obvious what we should do; commensuration would make our ethical or practical problems easy to solve in the same way that it is easy to choose between $50 and $200 (Nussbaum 1986:114).
But for Plato, an equally important feature of commensuration is that this willful elimination of the heterogeneity of values also stabilizes our emotions and attachments by removing motives for irrational behavior, motives such as commitment to passionate, singular love. If in using a general concept of value we can frame our choices as between more or less of the same quantity, we no longer feel the same way toward those things. If we understand our lover not as a uniquely compelling person but rather as one who provides us with some specific amount of general pleasure, we value our lover not only differently, but less. The more interchangeable our lover is with someone nearly as beautiful or more clever, the less vulnerable we are, and the less likely we are to pursue our lover with reckless abandon.
Plato's claim is powerful. He understood that in making us more stable and less passionate, commensuration was both appealing and frightening. For Aristotle, Nussbaum argues, eliminating our vulnerability, and therefore our passion, was a prospect too disturbing. He believed our sense of beauty depends precisely on its ephemeral qualities, that our ethics require us to invest in the singularity of others. Investing in what is unique is risky, but the loss of vulnerability is even more threatening, for goodness requires ethical risks, valuing things for their own sake, passion. For Aristotle, the fragility of goodness is undermined by understanding value as general and homogeneous (Nussbaum 1986 Labor has dual qualities. Concrete labor is the distinctive labor process shaped by the particular things it produces, things that have specific uses for people, such as food to eat or clothes to wear. Concrete labor produces usevalue, but it does not produce value in the general sense. Abstract labor, on the other hand, is the "socially necessary general labor" that produces undifferentiated value. It is the peculiar way we obtain goods under capitalism, where what we produce has no intrinsic relation to the products we ultimately acquire through our labor (Postone 1996, p. 149). Value, as an expression of abstract labor, commensurates because it abstracts away the distinctiveness of the particular forms of work, objects of work, and practical uses of these objects. The concrete labor that produces use-value and the abstract labor that constitutes value are not two separate kinds of labor but rather two aspects of labor under capitalism (Postone 1996:144 (Brubaker 1984:29-35 ). Calculation and standardization were crucial in each of these processes.
To take one example, Weber (1981:276) argued that rational capital accounting, a sophisticated form of commensuration, was essential to the development of modem capitalism. Accounting allows capitalists to rationally evaluate the outcomes of past investments, to calculate exactly the resources available to them and project future income, and to assess and compare future investments. Accounting reconceptualizes and depersonalizes business relations and fosters an objective stance toward business. But as Weber shows us, efforts to rationalize can be hard-fought battles. Those who benefit from an existing system of authority often resist mightily the intrusion of commensuration that threatens their privilege (Swetz 1987:181-82; Weber 1981:224) .
The efficiency of bureaucracies and economic transactions depends on their growing depersonalization and objectification. The impersonality of economic and bureaucratic rationality is vastly enhanced by commensuration, because it standardizes relations between disparate things and reduces the relevance of context. This impersonality is hostile to ethical systems that depend on personal ties, which explains why religious elites often have aligned with aristocrats to protect patriarchal relations.
One way to think about the tension between ethical systems and formal rationality is to conceptualize it as a contest over the limits of commensuration. Ethical and political systems based on personal relations often emphasize the uniqueness of individuals or the distinctive relations between certain categories of individuals. But rational systems depend on numerous forms of commensuration, on bureaucracies that strictly separate offices from their incum-bents, and on the elaborate rules that define offices. One might interpret formal rationality as rendering offices unique and the people who hold the offices commensurable. In this way, the incommensurability of individuals that is basic to much ethics confronts the radical commensuration of formal rationality. Conflicts generated by such confrontations are irreconcilable.
Where Weber emphasized the technical superiority of rational forms, Simmel was attentive to their symbolic and constitutive power. He investigated how our collaboration with social forms changes us. Simmel's (1978) extended analysis of money offers a brilliant analysis of commensuration. Simmel sees money as largely responsible for the increasing divergence between the objective and subjective culture that characterizes modem life. Money speeds up the pace of the production of cultural forms, making it harder for individuals to assimilate them. Money advances the development of people's intellectual faculties over their emotional faculties because of its vibrant instrumentality, its character as the "perfect tool." This quality extends the causal connections we make between things to such an extent that the end point, the ultimate value, becomes obscure. This is what accounts for the "calculating character of modem times," where people become obsessed with "measuring, weighing, and calculating" (Simmel 1978 :443-4).
When a form becomes taken for granted as a means of understanding relationships and values, things that are hard to assimilate to the form seem increasingly unreal. Money also contributes to the transformation of substantive values into money values; this homogenizes life, but it also offers autonomy, even freedom. Simmel concludes his analysis with a profound point: Over time, money increasingly approximates a pure symbol of the relativity of value and of the relativistic character of existence more generally-a character that money helped to define (Simmel 1978:512 ).
Simmel's insights about money can be usefully extended to other forms of commensuration. Utility, for example, is an even more enveloping form of relativity because it embodies the relativity of all value, even of those things without prices. Utility can precisely convey any value and its relation to any other value, whether it is fresh air, children, or even death.3
The compulsion to create forms stems from our need to make sense of the world, but as Simmel understood, forms may possess a force that seems to adhere to them independent of their users. Forms create expectations as well as coherence, and a form's familiarity encourages our complicity. This complic30ne important difference between money and other forms of commensuration is that some commensurated forms are even more abstract than money, having no tangible existence that makes their symbolic expression less distant. Utility cannot be inscribed with the faces of queens, so perhaps this makes it a less effective symbol. Because some forms of commensuration, including money, are so closely tied to our notions of rationality, these forms can symbolize rationality. ity enhances the rhetorical appeal of forms and is one reason we find them compelling (see Burke 1969:58-59). Commensuration encourages us to believe that we can integrate all our values, unify our compartmentalized worlds, and measure our longings.
Fundamental to classical critiques of modernity, commensuration is also central to many contemporary versions of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory varies in its assumptions, goals, and applications, but many versions make commensuration a prerequisite for rationality. Steinbrunner 
WHY COMMENSURATION MATTERS
Investigating commensuration is important because it is ubiquitous and demands vast resources, discipline, and organization. Commensuration can radically transform the world by creating new social categories and backing them with the weight of powerful institutions. Commensuration is political: It reconstructs relations of authority, creates new political entities, and establishes new interpretive frameworks. Despite some advocates' claims, it is not a neutral or merely technical process.
Commensuration is everywhere, and we are more likely to notice failures of commensuration than its widespread, varied success. Our faith in price as a measure of value is so naturalized that we now routinely simulate markets for elusive and intangible qualities. Although efforts to price tubing might have failed, there are well-established procedures for attaching prices to everything from corporate goodwill to surrogate pregnancies.
Where markets do not exist they are often invented. Corporations routinely create internal markets for the goods and services produced by subunits, and these fictive prices matter enormously in people's jobs (Eccles 1985). Some business schools require students to bid for their courses. Economists advocate creating markets in pollution to help curtail both pollution and theoretically unsavory externalities (Baumol & Oates 1979). Insurers work to quantify such consequential uncertainties as the professional reputations of their clients (Heimer 1985) .
Economists have developed dazzling techniques for measuring utility, and its conceptual and practical influence is hard to overstate. There is hardly an issue in government that is not framed by the logic of cost-benefit analysis; its deployment in matters of health care and safety (Jasanoff 1989 Commensuration is a radical social form, partly because of the assumptions that inform its use. Its long associations with rationality make it ideologically potent. Assuming that values can be made commensurate and that commensuration is a prerequisite to rationality are powerful ideas. Embedded in this logic is another assumption: that all value is relative and that the value of something can be expressed only in terms of its relation to something else. This form of valuing denies the possibility of intrinsic value, pricelessness, or any absolute category of value. Commensuration presupposes that widely disparate or even idiosyncratic values can be expressed in standardized ways and that these expressions do not alter meanings relevant to decisions.
Commensuration is radically inclusive. It offers an abstract form of unity that can potentially encompass any valued thing. Whether commensuration is accomplished in a price, utility curve, cost-benefit ratio, or multi-attribute trade-off scheme, any value or preference can be made commensurate with any other. The capacity to create relationships between virtually anything is extraordinary in that it simultaneously overcomes distance (by creating ties between things where none before had existed) and imposes distance (by expressing value in such abstract, remote ways). In doing so, commensuration creates new things, new relations among disparate and remote things, and changes the meanings of old things (Goody 1986).
According to Hacking (1990:181-95), from 1820 to 1840, unprecedented and nearly universal numerical enthusiasm produced an "avalanche of numbers." One result was the discovery of an astonishing number of regularities: in worker illness, suicide, crime, epidemics, and childbearing. Determinism was a casualty of the exponential growth in the production of numbers, as quests for "exactness" gave way to relentless efforts to understand and tame chance. Another consequence was the rapid proliferation of categories-categories invented to name and sort the newfound regularities, categories that then became constitutive.
The category of "society," Porter argues, is largely a statistical construct (1995:37, 1986:156-57). The regularities revealed in suicide and crime could not be attributed to individuals. A broader category was needed to account for them, and beginning around 1830, they were designated properties of society. Techniques for commensurating are not evenly distributed. These patterns may reflect longstanding interests in commensuration, where those with the most to gain from commensuration have become its most sophisticated practitioners. Not surprisingly, water development agencies had sophisticated methods for calculating the benefits of dams long before they devised these for costs (Espeland 1993 ). Other biases exist. Units of analyses are often used that obscure the distributional effects of policies. Cost-benefit analyses that "discount the future" favor immediate benefits and distant costs over long-term benefits and immediate costs. This spurs development at the expense of environmental costs (Schnaiberg 1980:334-44 The importance of incommensurable categories will vary, partly because the significance of this symbolic boundary varies. Their salience depends on how passionate we feel about them, on their centrality in defining our roles and identities, and on how much effort is required to breach them. Their importance also depends, as Simmel would argue, on the relative status of their oppositional form, commensuration. The extension of commensuration into more spheres of life may make incommensurable categories more meaningful, their defense more necessary. This extension may produce paradoxical effects, as when "pricing" children in law, labor, and insurance shifted the terms of their value from primarily economic to moral and emotional. Children became priceless (Zelizer 1985).
Sometimes trivial things are incommensurable. If I cannot choose between chocolate cake and lemon pie, and adding whipped cream to the cake doesn't make it better or worse, these desserts are formally incommensurable but hardly significant for how I understand myself or how I treat others. Sometimes incommensurables are expressed for purely strategic reasons, as a bargaining position. One way to get more leverage or a better price during negotiations is to assert the incommensurability of something. Labeling something as bargaining in order to discredit claims can also be a political response (Espeland 1998) .
But incommensurables can be vital expressions of core values, signaling to people how they should act toward those things. Identities and crucial roles are often defined with incommensurable categories. Believing that something is incommensurable can qualify one for some kinds of relationships. When incommensurable categories are important for defining how to "be," Raz calls them "constitutive incommensurables" (Raz 1986:345-57). People facing a choice involving a constitutive incommensurable will often refuse to participate; for some, the idea of such a choice is abhorrent.
For Yavapai residents whose ancestral land was threatened by a proposed dam, land was a constitutive incommensurable (Espeland 1998 ). The Yavapai understood themselves in relation to this specific land. Valuing land as an incommensurable was closely tied to what it means to be Yavapai. The rational decision models used by bureaucrats to evaluate the proposed dam required that the various components of the decision be made commensurate, including the cost and consequences associated with the forced resettlement of the Yavapai community. This way of representing Yavapai interests and expressing the value of their land was a contradiction of those values and of Yavapai identity.
There are many other, common examples of constitutive incommensurables. Two of Raz's examples are children and friends. Believing that the value of children is not comparable to money and that the very idea of ex-changing a child for money is repugnant is fundamental to being a good parent. The inappropriateness of using commercial means for valuing children is one way we define good parenting. Likewise, believing that friendship cannot be bought or that what we derive from our friendship with a person is distinctive and cannot be had with any other person is basic to what it means to be a good friend. Thinking that our friends were somehow interchangeable could keep us from having genuine friendships. The pain of selling a childhood home, the reluctance some feel about selling their blood, our disapproval of sex for profit, or even faculty qualms over ranking graduate students or evaluating subordinates compared to "benchmarks" are examples of people grappling with incommensurable categories. Believing in incommensurables is a way to limit what can be rationally chosen, and this can be an important social relationship.
Just as commensuration is a considerable social accomplishment, so too the creation of incommensurables requires work. Some party must draw boundaries around the thing whose value is to be kept, or made, distinctive and then defend the boundaries from encroachment. Sometimes these tasks are the purview of experts: art critics and museum professionals who certify some objects as masterworks or as especially worth exhibiting (Becker 1982 , Alexander 1996 ; attending physicians who invoke clinical wisdom and professional privilege to designate some medical cases extraordinary (Bosk 1979). Sometimes these tasks are the purview of intimate others: the mothers and fathers of premature newborns, for example, who are encouraged by hospital staff to name their babies, dress them in clothes brought from home, personalize their ward cribs with toys and photographs, and otherwise mark their infants as unique (Heimer & Staffen 1998) . In still other instances the production of incommensurables is the main business of entire organizations, even bureaucratic ones: preservation agencies, for example, that designate official historic sites, landmark neighborhoods, and wildlife habitats, as well as the organizations that do the grunt work of enforcing the rules. Whether they are priceless artworks, national treasures, or precious children, incommensurable things are often regarded as somehow sacred, and like all sacred objects, their distinctiveness is defined through symbols and ritual. This marking can be elaborate, or mundane: For example, the sequestering of certain cash in a special jar or drawer can define it as money for distinctive purposes and thus incommensurable with other savings (Zelizer 1994).
STUDYING COMMENSURATION
Commensuration is a general social process, it is political, and it is capable of transforming social relations. It deserves closer, systematic scrutiny. We next offer core guiding questions that help reveal variation in how naturalized, how fateful, and how resisted commensuration can be. Institutionalization as reification enables us to make predictions about the potential trajectory of other commensurative practices. We might expect, for example, that college rankings will become more constitutive of what they measure as their audiences expand: parents considering where to send their tuition dollars, faculty plotting careers at prestigious schools, and foundations whose grant-giving attends to such measures of institutional quality. On the other hand, commensurative acts that fail to get etched into practice, such as comparable-worth policies, will remain the purview of academic specialists and disappointed reformers.
How Institutionalized Is the

How Does Commensuration Refract Power Relations?
Some proponents see commensuration as a technology of inclusion. This makes it especially valuable in democratic, pluralistic societies (Stokey & Zeckhauser 1978) . Commensuration offers an adaptive, broadly legitimate device for conferring a formal parity in an unequal world; for pragmatic reformers, this is a hopeful beginning (Espeland 1998 , Brown 1984 . In decisions characterized by disparate values, diverse forms of knowledge, and the wish to incorporate people's preferences, commensuration offers a rigorous method for democratizing decisions and sharing power.
For supporters, the discipline of commensuration creates robust, "objective" knowledge that can constrain power. For example, Marx used the "moral statistics" of his day as essential weapons in his indictment of capitalism; Weber (1978:225) saw commensuration facilitating the leveling effects of bureaucratic rationality by providing sturdy mechanisms for challenging old forms of privilege; today, discrimination is often fought most effectively with numbers, by lawyers girded with statistics; and when standardized tests are used in hiring decisions, the odds for minorities can improve (Neckerman & Kirschenman 1991).
Critics of commensuration come from both the right and left. Conservatives disdain its equalizing effects, the loss of elite discretion that it fosters. Leftleaning critics see commensuration as another conduit of power that mystifies power relations, partly by emphasizing results at the expense of process and distribution (e.g. Tribe 1971 Tribe , 1972 . Commensuration, in propelling "decisionism," helps sustain the pretense that facts and values can be separated, that politics can be rendered technical (Habermas 1973:253-82).
But commensuration is not merely a tool of the powerful, a way to wage interest politics numerically. Porter (1995) argues that recourse to quantitative methods evinces weak authority. The spread of quantitative expertise represents a quest for "mechanical objectivity"-knowledge whose authority is based on close adherence to quantitative rules. Mechanical objectivity is most valued when decision-making is dispersed, when it incorporates diverse groups, when powerful outsiders must be accounted to, when decisions are public and politicized, and when decision-makers are distrusted. The legitimacy offered by numbers diminishes autonomy, because discretion is replaced by disciplined methods. This is why quantitative technologies are the province of weak elites and why they are resisted by those whose authority depends on expert judgment, character, or informal knowledge.
Understanding commensuration as a calculus of power requires that we appreciate the various guises of power, whether these are obvious or opaque, strategic or constitutive. While examples of numbers malleable enough to conform to powerful interests are easy to find (e.g. Delaney 1994), commensuration, once launched, can become hard to control. Strategic commensuration, our capacity to create numbers that reflect our will, is perhaps greatest when commensuration is less public and less accessible and when methods are new or not grounded in academic theory (which creates new partisans). Those who think they can manipulate numbers at will are often proved wrong in the long run.
Commensuration's constitutive power is perhaps an even more formidable force, altering the people and places where it intrudes. The capacity to create new categories and enforce mechanical objectivity are consequential powers, ones often associated with states or firms. Official statistics may be more important for the subjects they create ("Hispanics," "the unemployed," "gifted children") than for the technical advantage this knowledge confers. Once the categories are in place, people's behavior increasingly conforms to them. This is not the obvious power of coercion but the more elusive, passive power of discipline, increasingly self-inflicted. The validity of censuses, test scores, or public opinion polls requires complicity from their subjects. Individuals are made governable (Foucault 1991:87-104 ) and numbers become self-vindicating (Porter 1995:45) when measures guide the activities being measured or shape the images of those whose characteristics they measure.
Commensuration produces depersonalized, public forms of knowledge that are often deemed superior to private, particularistic forms of knowing (Reddy 1984). The authority of those who know most about something can be undermined by the rigorous methods of distant, if less informed, officials. For example, before measures were standardized by states, regions and villages often had their own distinctive measures. Such heterogeneity in measurement enhanced the salience of local knowledge and facilitated negotiability. A "just price" for a unit of grain could be accomplished by peasant strategies for manipulating how densely packed it was. This flexibility favored local interests over state powers; hence rulers often eagerly imposed new, standardized measures (Kula 1986 ).
Commensuration refracts power in many ways. It can enlarge decisionmaking or legitimate preordained decisions. It can be cynically manipulated by elites or it can limit their discretion. It can create disciplined subjectivities or arm dissenters. This variety makes commensuration a useful lens for investigating the multiple forms of power.
When Are Claims about Incommensurables Made?
Perhaps because of their ability to constitute value and alter power relations, some instances of commensuration generate discontent. Claims that some values are incommensurable-that they cannot or should not be ordinarily compared with other values-are not uncommon. Nor are they random. We hypothesize that the most frequent and most durable claims about incommensurability occur at the borderlands between institutional spheres, where different modes of valuing overlap and conflict. We suspect also that claims about incommensurables are likely when commensuration threatens some cherished identity.
Friedland & Alford (1991:232) define institutions as both supraorganizational patterns of activity and symbolic systems through which we give meaning to activity. Because societies are complexes of multiple institutions, they are characterized by multiple modes of valuing. We value monetarily when we enter a labor or commodity market; emotionally when espousing friendship or love for children or a mate; and bureaucratically when we gauge merit or fault by reference to formal rules. These different modes of valuing are not necessarily consistent with one another. A job that pays well may estrange us from loved ones if it requires a move to another city. Meticulous devotion to formal rules may make us adequate bureaucrats but horrible friends (Heimer 1992 What makes commercial surrogate motherhood a locus of claims about incommensurables? The practice exists in a social space where neither intimate nor market modes of valuing are hegemonic. As the legal scholar Margaret Radin notes, the distinction between the baby-selling of commercial surrogate motherhood and the baby-giving of traditional adoption arrangements-in which adoptive parents often wait for a child of a particular race or age and pay many costs associated with pregnancy-is a fragile one (Radin 1996:136-53) . In such uncertain terrain we are likely to find vocal advocates for one or another mode of valuing, and claims about incommensurables can be viable weapons in the struggle to control the contested turf.
Incommensurables will also be claimed where entrepreneurs of one mode of valuing wish to move in to novel terrain. Radin's careful bid for the market incommensurability of children (1996), for example, is a direct response to celebrated arguments for a market in them (Posner 1992 Claims about incommensurables are also likely when commensuration threatens a cherished identity. When commensuration seems to discount some component of the self, the short-changed may disavow the implicating mode of valuing. Like their forbearers in the alternative-school movement (Swidler 1979), many parents who home school their children are suspicious of letter grading and formal achievement tests that enable their children's skills to be compared quantitatively with those of other children. Deeply protective of the individuality of their children, home schoolers fear that standardized performance measures at best prevent, at worst erode, a conception of children as uniquely gifted persons (Stevens 1996) .
Because collective identities are often defined symbolically, efforts to commensurate symbolic objects with other valuables can meet with fierce resistance. Because geographic territory is often deeply symbolic of national identity, for example, disputes over territorial sovereignty are often long and bitter. The impassioned territorial commitments of Israeli and Palestinian peoples have confounded countless efforts to commensurate territorial interests at diplomatic bargaining tables (Friedland & Hecht 1996) .
That claims about incommensurables are sometimes made by parties who may risk loss suggests that such claims may be more strategic than constitutive. It is tempting to infer that claims of incommensurability are themselves a kind of bargaining strategy, akin to bluffing in a poker game to cover a bad hand or to up an opponent's ante. Surely some claims of incommensurability are strategic in this way. But claims about incommensurables may also simul-taneously reflect deeply held convictions and clever bet-hedging. People who lose their community to an industrial disaster may find the symbolic void irreplaceable but will also use that loss as grounds for material compensation (Erikson 1976). Disentangling the constitutive from the strategic in claims about incommensurables requires careful empirical work and recognition that people often have multiple and even contradictory incentives.
COMMENSURATION IN ACTION
We believe that attention to commensuration provides novel insights into established fields of sociological inquiry. To conclude, we illustrate how such an analytic focus might inform work in three broad substantive areas: gender and work, politics and social movements, and institutional sociology. Our goal is to sketch the potential utility of this way of theorizing in order to encourage further and more systematic efforts. 
Feminist Commensuration and Its Discontents
Politics and Social Movements
Commensuration makes possible modem politics. Opinion polls, in eliciting and organizing attitudes, create the object we call public opinion (Herbst 1998) . Politics, as the art of compromise, is a broad instance of commensuration. Political negotiation entails seeing one's own interests as comparable to the interests of others. Our conception of interests as a basic unit of political analysis implies commensuration. When political disputes are framed as a contest over interests, parties are granted a formal, categorical equality among those with a political stake. Interest-group politics portrays outcomes as if differences were a matter of magnitude-of how much something matters, or of whose interests were served-rather than as disparate modes of investment in the decision. Voting is one way to commensurate interests. Trading-of campaign dollars for a sympathetic ear in office, of my vote on your project for yours on mine (the essence of pork-barrel politics), of tit for tat at the bargaining tables where multiple interest groups attempt to forge mutually advantageous coalitions-requires that traders evaluate diverse interests along some shared order of magnitude. Such commensurative acts are at the heart of normal politics, explaining puzzles such as why we have so many dams (Reisner 1986) That some movement activists from left to right have been wary of the compromises normal politics requires suggests their awareness of the transformative potential inherent in commensurating disparate values.6 When we opt to negotiate with parties who do not share our vision of the world (e.g. members of the "Establishment," those not born again), we risk alienation of our interests. Negotiation requires commensurating with the enemy: It requires comparing the cherished with the reprehensible in ways that make the former less distinctive, less incomparably valuable than it once was. Not surprisingly, movements that stake their identities on incommensurables-radical democracy, heavenly truths, and native lands, for examples-face a dilemma even coming to the bargaining table.
(Of course, sometimes social movements embrace commensuration as a legitimating device. For women's reform organizations during the Progressive Era, the substitution of money for personal service was a way for women to 6Just as commensuration creates new social relations, so too does creating incommensurables. Not all incommensurables carry the same cultural weight, but some things defined as incommensurable may be subject to distinct rules of conduct. For example, family heirlooms bestowed on particular persons are often subject to special uses and, except under extraordinary conditions, are removed from markets. signal that theirs were serious, modem organizations. As Clemens (1997: 209-10) argues, these women understood that citizenship required cash.)
Institutional Sociology
The ability of commensuration to create new social relations and even new social entities is clear in recent work by institutional sociologists. Studies of the elaboration and worldwide diffusion of census activity (Ventresca 1995 But commensuration does more than produce new relations. It can also produce new entities. Common to these quite different studies of censuses and accounting procedures is the notion, informed in part by the work of Foucault (1973 Foucault ( , 1977 Foucault ( , 1978 , that preponderant administrative practices create what they purport to describe. For example, Ventresca argues that modem census procedures help to create the nation-states they quantify. Censuses define the boundaries of state sovereignty by specifying just who is within those boundaries and who is not. The very structure of a census as an official count of persons assumes an aggregate relationship between nation and individual-the nation-state is the individuals it counts. Censuses also reify these individuals, marking them as non-, quasi-, or full citizens of a particular state and lending broad cultural salience to those facets of individual identity about which census counters, and their questionnaires, query (Ventresca 1995) . In rendering nation-states more comparable, censuses also constitute what they compare (Desrosieres 1990 ).
Conceptually similar processes characterize the rise of formal accounting procedures. Accountants, promising information that will improve efficiency, have historically sought ever more elaborate means of measuring labor output and labor costs; such measurements enable designation of modal and optimal levels of productivity against which many workers can be ranked and compared. Accounts thus help to construct such organizationally consequential beings as the average worker, the ideal worker, and the suboptimal worker (Miller & O'Leary 1987).
Social critics from Simmel to Foucault have sought to portray how modernization reconstitutes human subjectivity and transforms long-established social relations. Examining particular instances of commensuration may enable institutional scholars to better discern the mechanics of those changes. Recent theoretical work underscores this potential. Neoinstitutionalists operationalize modernity as a "Western cultural account," global in scope, that among other things assumes the calculability of all social values. In that modern story, human progress is incremental: Only by measuring can individuals or nation-states know how they are faring in personal or global history (Meyer et al 1994) . Acts of commensuration facilitate comparative measurement across vast differences of sentiment, person, kind, culture, and nation. Rationalist, imperialist, and at times transformative, they may be key ways that we make ourselves modern.
